Northern Illinois University

Huskie Commons
Northern Illinois Law Review Supplement

College of Law

7-1-2011

Vol. 2 No. 2, Summer 2011; Particularly Serious Crimes and
Withholding of Removal: An Aggravating Question
Jessica Fiocchi

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr_sup
Part of the Law Commons

Original Citation
Jessica Fiocchi, Comment, Particularly Serious Crimes and Withholding of Removal: An Aggravating
Question, 2 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. Online Supp. 67 (2011).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois Law Review Supplement by an authorized administrator of Huskie
Commons. For more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

Particularly Serious Crimes and Withholding
of Removal: An Aggravating Question
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 67
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND ............................................................... 70
III. ANALYSIS ............................................................................................. 78
A. PLAIN MEANING.............................................................................. 78
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ................................................................... 81
C. BURDEN OF PROOF .......................................................................... 81
D. COMPARISON TO CONVENTION ....................................................... 82
E. HISTORY OF “AGGRAVATED FELONY” ............................................ 83
F. HISTORY OF “PARTICULARLY SERIOUS CRIME” .............................. 84
G. BURDEN ON UNITED STATES SYSTEMS ........................................... 85
H. FRENTESCU FACTORS ...................................................................... 87
IV. RESULTS ................................................................................................ 89
A. EFFECTS OF ADOPTION ................................................................... 89
1.
Non-Refoulement .............................................................. 89
2.
Reduced Power of Attorney General ................................ 90
V. CONCLUSION......................................................................................... 91

I. INTRODUCTION
El Salvador is a nation whose inhabitants have long suffered from violence, death, and a disregard of basic human rights that so many of us take
for granted.1 During its civil war, which stretched for twelve years from
1980 until 1992,2 the Salvadoran government was the main violent actor,
responsible for “extrajudicial executions, torture and forced disappearances.”3
When Hernan Ishmael Delgado entered the United States over twenty
years ago, that Civil War was in full force.4 Not only would Delgado have
been justified in fearing for his life and safety due to the widespread occur1. Nicole Hertvik, El Salvador: Effecting Changes from Within, UN CHRONICLE,
Sept.-Nov.
2002,
available
at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1309/is_3_39/ai_93211770/.
2.
The World Factbook: El Salvador, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Jan. 19,
2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/es.html.
3. See Hertvik, supra note 1 (describing that these acts were routinely committed
by the military, death squads, and government security forces).
4.
Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 621 F.3d
957 (9th Cir. 2010).
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rence of such brutality, but he also had personal history with such treatment.5 He had “evidence that his mother, and probably his father, were victims of the rampant human rights violations that took place in El Salvador
in the late 1970s and early 1980s,” which was early on in, and even before,
the civil war.6
While the violence in El Salvador has decreased since the end of the
war, it is still not gone.7 Urban gang violence has been on the rise, mostly
caused by locals feeling “fear, suspicion and discrimination” toward Salvadorans returning to the country from the United States, where they have
been living for long periods of time.8
Because of the way United States law handles this situation in some
districts, people like Hernan Ishmael Delgado are sent back to their native
countries where they may be kidnapped, tortured, or murdered, for crimes
that are not even considered serious enough to be aggravated crimes in the
United States.9 Delgado was sent back to El Salvador based on convictions
for driving under the influence of alcohol.10 These are not aggravated felonies in the United States, and yet they were enough to send him back to El
Salvador, where his punishment may be death.11
While this interpretation of the relevant law is not an acceptable one,
the burden on the United States’ system of justice makes it imperative that
the most dangerous criminals be sent back to their native countries, as long
as the situation complies with the United States’ international commitments
(which are discussed in Part II of this Comment).12 While these interests do
compete with one another, they can be reconciled by keeping in mind that
the United States has a duty both to its own citizens, by being responsible in
the costs it allows on its justice system, and to the rest of the world, by
keeping its word that it will be a protector of human rights.13
5. See id. at 874.
6. Id. at 874.
7. See Hertvik, supra note 1 (stating that while government offenses have significantly decreased since the end of the war, private violence and killing has been on the rise).
8. See id. (describing that gang violence in urban areas has been especially prevalent since the U.S. has changed its policies and begun sending Salvadoran nationals back to
their native country. The gangs are formed mostly from young men who have been living in
the United States, who band together in gangs in order to protect themselves and gain acceptance due to suspicious attitudes with which the locals regard them when they return).
9. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 868.
10. Id. at 866.
11. Id. at 867.
12. Impact of Fed. Immigration Policy and INS Activities on Communities: Hearings Before the Info., Justice, Transp., & Agric. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 103d Cong. 36 (1994) (statement of Joe Sandoval, Secretary, Youth and Adult Correctional Agency, accompanied by Tom Goggenhauer, California Department of Corrections).
13.
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 25, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150.
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As illustrated in the example above, immigration and removal of criminal aliens back to their native countries are significant and controversial
areas of United States law.14 The far-reaching impact that the removal of
aliens from the United States has on the person being removed, as well as
the people in the alien’s family and community, makes the issue one that
touches home to many.15 The aliens sent away from the United States and
back to their native countries experience a separation from their family and
friends in the United States, and the community in which they have lived.16
They lose any property that they have acquired in the United States.17 They
also face a loss of the livelihood that they have been practicing while living
in the United States.18 On top of these losses that would be expected on any
move to another country, the criminal alien that is removed is also prohibited from returning to the United States for a potentially indefinite period
of time.19 They lose any social security benefits that they have been receiving; benefits that they have paid for and that they may have depended
upon.20 Not only does the removal of aliens cause these hardships to the
individual being removed, but there are also emotional and financial losses
that the family members and others who are left behind have to face.21 With
all of these effects of an alien being removed from the United States, in
addition to the human rights concerns discussed above, it is essential to
have a policy to deal with these problems.22
To this end, the federal government has a statute in place called the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).23 The INA provides that the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country where the alien’s life or
freedom would be threatened due to race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.24 However, the statute also
provides an exception to this if the alien is convicted of a “particularly serious crime” and is a danger to the community of the United States.25

14. NATIONAL IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, 1
IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE § 8:19 (3d ed. 2009).
15. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 513 (2007).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Legomsky, supra note 15, at 513.
21. Id.
22. Marilyn Achiron, A ‘Timeless’ Treaty Under Attack, 123 REFUGEES 4 (2001)
(discussing the need for a solution to the world-wide refugee problem).
23. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006).
24.
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).
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This Comment discusses the interpretation of the phrase “particularly
serious crime” and argues that this term should only encompass crimes that
are classified as aggravated felonies.26 Part II discusses the background and
history behind the term, and investigates the intent of the legislature when it
passed the INA.27 This Comment explains the circuit split between the
Second, Seventh, and Ninth, Circuits (which held that crimes do not need to
be aggravated felonies in order to be considered particularly serious), and
the Third and Eighth Circuits, along with the dissenting opinion in the
Ninth Circuit case, Delgado v. Holder (which held that only aggravated
felonies should be considered particularly serious crimes).28 The Comment
then analyzes the legislative history, court cases, and statutes on point and
explains that aggravated felonies are the only crimes that should be considered “particularly serious” in order to fit into the legislative intent and
international commitments of the United States government.29
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The legislature of the United States passed the INA in order to conform with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which followed the United Nations Convention on the same subject.30
The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 1459 (1993) (discussing the legislative intent of the
INA).
28. See, e.g., Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that because the
defendant was convicted of an aggravated felony, he was removable from the United States);
Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that although some aggravated
crimes are automatically considered to be particularly serious, this does not preclude the
attorney general from finding that a non-aggravated crime is also particularly serious), reh’g
granted, 621 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010); Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding that the Second Circuit defers to the decision of the BIA in that crimes do not need
to be aggravated felonies in order to be considered to be particularly serious); Ali v. Achim,
468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that non-aggravated crimes may be considered to be
particularly serious if the Attorney General so designates them); Alaka v. Att’y Gen. of U.S.,
456 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the plain meaning of the applicable statute supports
the conclusion that in order to be particularly serious crimes, the offense must be an aggravated felony).
29. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006);
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 25, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 (describing the international obligations of the United States).
30.
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 25, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150; Achiron, supra note 22 (explaining that the United Nations Protocol
expanded the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.) The Convention originally only applied to refugees in Europe before January 1, 1951. Id. The Protocol
increased this application to eliminate the time constraints originally in place through the
Convention. Id.
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considered “the Magna Carta of international refugee law,” and is the controlling international human rights legislation dealing with refugees.31
While it was not the first attempt the United Nations and other organizations have made at refugee protection, it has been the most far-reaching and
successful program ever adopted.32 Delegates from twenty-six countries
met in Geneva in 1951 to solve the problem of hundreds of thousands of
refugees after World War II.33 Three weeks later, the Convention was
adopted.34 The scope of the Convention was limited to refugees in Europe
and events that occurred before January 1, 1951, because it was difficult to
get countries to agree to obligations for the future, as they would not know
the number of refugees with which they would be dealing.35 Also, the drafters of the Convention did not expect the refugee problem to be a major
international problem for very long.36 The issue they had originally met to
deal with was the World War II refugees, rather than a large future worldwide problem.37
However, the crisis spread throughout the rest of the world after that,
eventually leading to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.38 The Protocol eliminated the time constraints the drafters had put on
the Convention, due to the global need for a more far reaching solution to
the refugee crisis.39 There are 140 signatories to the Convention and the
Protocol today, and according to a United Nations article, “more states
helped draft the treaty–and have since ratified it–than have supported any
other refugee instrument” to date.40 The significance of the Convention and
Protocol are emphasized by the fact that so many nations have followed and
depended on them in the development of their own laws, including the
United States as seen with the INA.41
The non-refoulement42 provision of the Protocol, or the article requiring a prohibition on expulsion or return, states that no refugee shall be returned to a nation “where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
31.
Achiron, supra note 22.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 10.
35. Id. at 8.
36.
Achiron, supra note 22, at 12.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 12-13.
40. Id. at 11.
41. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006).
42. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining non-refoulement as “[a]
refugee's right not to be expelled from one state to another, esp[ecially] to one where his or
her life or liberty would be threatened”).
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group or political opinion.”43 The Convention also provides an exception to
this for refugees who are “convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime” or “constitutes a danger to the community of the country.”44
The Convention and Protocol define the term “refugee” to include
those who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of their
“race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,” and are afraid to return to their native country due to this
fear.45
This is almost the exact language that the United States later used in
the INA in its “withholding of removal” exception, which states that the
United States “may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” unless the alien “having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime is a danger to the
community of the United States.”46
The closeness of the language between the U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and the statute suggest that the United States legislature intended to carry out the purpose of that provision of the Convention to protect the fundamental human rights and freedoms of refugees as
stated in the Preamble of that document.47 The intent to protect those who
may be in danger in their own nation is one consideration in the interpretation of the language of the statute, as shown by the legislative history of the
Fairness in Cocaine Sentencing Act of 2009, which amended the INA: “the
bills should be reviewed in light of their implications for adherence to our
obligations under the U.N. Refugee Convention and Protocol.”48
Human rights are not, however, the only concern involved in deciding
which aliens should be removed from the United States.49 The House of
Representatives’ hearings reflect large concerns with the costs that fall on
the state and local governments within the United States when criminal
43.
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July 25,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006).
47.
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 25, 1951,
pmbl. art. 33, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; 1 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE §1.03 [5][e].
48. H.R. REP. NO. 1459 (1993).
49. See Impact of Federal Immigration Policy and INS Activities on Communities:
Hearings Before the Info., Justice, Transp., & Agric. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t
Operations, 103d Cong. 36 (1994) (statement of Joe Sandoval, Secretary, Youth and Adult
Correctional Agency, accompanied by Tom Goggenhauer, California Department of Corrections).
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aliens are kept in the country.50 For example, costs for medical care, education, police forces, and prison systems add up.51 Most relevant to the statute
at issue is the cost to the criminal justice system of all felonies and misdemeanors committed by aliens, which could cost federal and state governments over one billion dollars in one year.52 In the push to curb costs, the
legislature faces pressure to remove as many of these non-citizens as possible.53 Rather than causing the legislature to rethink its position on the human rights aspect of the statute, the legislative history reveals that these
cost concerns are aimed at the Immigration and Naturalization Service and
its effectiveness at enforcing the law.54 The decisions made with respect to
the INA are interpreted by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which
decides if the INA has properly applied the statute.55 The BIA issues interim decisions to “provide guidance to Immigration Judges, the INS, and the
private sector.”56 The BIA attempts to decide cases dealing with aliens
charged with aggravated felonies within thirty days, but has had a large
growth in the number of cases it is dealing with and so is not as efficient as
it would like to be in dealing with these matters.57 Slower decision-making
on the part of the BIA slows the removal process, leaving the United States
with more costs for longer periods of time, and leaving dangerous criminals
within U.S. borders for longer stretches. If the BIA can become more efficient in its decisions, this could save federal and state governments millions
of dollars and alleviate some of the burdens they are carrying.58
The exemption for aliens convicted of particularly serious crimes and
those considered a danger to the community of the United States applies
both to applications for asylum and applications for withholding of removal.59 However, there is a difference in interpretation of the term “particularly serious crime” in the two statutes, as pointed out by the dissent in Delga50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 173.
53. Id.
54. The Immigration and Naturalization Service: A Mandate for Change, Hearing
Before the Info., Justice, Transp., and Agric. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 103d Cong. (1993).
55. Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims Oversight Hearing on the Removal of
Criminal and Illegal Aliens, 104th Cong. 23 (1996) (statement of Anthony C. Moscato and
Margaret M. Philbin).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. The Immigration and Naturalization Service: A Mandate for Change, Hearing
Before the Info., Justice, Transp., and Agric. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 103d Cong. (1993).
59. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006); Asylum,
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2009).
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do v. Holder.60 The asylum statute, Section 1158, allows the Attorney General to designate particularly serious crimes as such by regulation, whereas
the withholding of removal statute, Section 1231, calls for this designation
to be made on a case-by-case basis.61 Also, for withholding of removal, the
alien could be sent away to a third country and is not guaranteed a right to
remain in the United States, whereas asylum guarantees a right to remain in
the United States.62 Along the same lines, withholding of removal is mandatory if the alien is eligible and does not fall into one of the exceptions in the
statute, while asylum is discretionary.63 The particularly serious crime exception in the withholding of removal statute includes all aggravated felonies with sentences over five years, whereas the asylum statute includes all
aggravated felonies and others that may be so designated.64
The withholding of removal statute, then, is limited to crimes that are
more serious in nature and is more strictly applied than the asylum statute.65
This is consistent with the idea that the INS should try to be more efficient
at enforcing immigration laws with more dangerous criminals.66
The discussion of a statute’s legislative history is only necessary when
the statute is ambiguous as written.67 The definition of a “particularly serious crime” as defined by the withholding of removal statute is ambiguous,
with varying interpretations among different circuits.68 Although the United
Nations Handbook suggests balancing the nature of the crime with the nature of the persecution to which the alien would be subjected if deported,
the U.S. rejected this way of judging which crimes are particularly serious.69 In Matter of Frentescu, the court laid out several factors to be considered in determining whether a crime should be particularly serious: “na60.
Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 878 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting),
reh’g granted, 621 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010); GORDON ET AL., supra note 47, at 3:33.04
[7][b].
61.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2006); Asylum, 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2009).
62.
Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29, 40 n.9 (1st Cir. 1997).
63. Id. at 40.
64.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2006); Asylum, 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B) (2009).
65. Id.
66. The Immigration and Naturalization Service: A Mandate for Change, Hearing
Before the Information, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture Subcomm. of the H. Comm.
on Government Operations, 103d Cong. (1993).
67.
Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 883 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting),
reh’g granted, 621 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010).
68. See, e.g., Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that because the
defendant was an aggravated felon, he was removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act); Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a crime does not need to be
an aggravated felony to be a particularly serious crime).
69. GORDON ET AL., supra note 47, § 33.06 [4][c]; 87 A.L.R. FED. 646 § 5.
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ture of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and, most importantly, whether the type
and circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the
community.”70 The INA set out aggravated felonies with a sentence of
longer than five years as per se particularly serious, although it left an opening for the discretion of the Attorney General in categorizing other things as
particularly serious.71
In discussing crimes that are per se particularly serious, the Immigration Law Service discussed drug trafficking crimes and the extraordinary
and compelling criteria for drug trafficking not to be considered particularly
serious.72 The criteria were listed as follows: “small quantity, modest
amount of money, peripheral involvement, absence of violence, absence of
organized crime or terrorism involvement, absence of adverse or harmful
effect of activity or transaction on juveniles.”73 This emphasizes the fact
that the categorization of certain crimes as particularly serious focuses on
the extent of the harm that the crime will cause, and should be limited to
only the most egregious offenses rather than allowing other less serious
crimes into the same category.74
In order to get a better understanding of the meaning of this categorization, the legislative history of “aggravated felony” sheds some light on
what the legislature intended.75 Beginning in 1988, the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act created the category “aggravated felony,” including only very serious
crimes such as murder, drug trafficking, or any illicit trafficking in firearms
or other destructive devices.76 The legislation that followed the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act served to broaden the definition of an aggravated felony, beginning with the Immigration Act of 1990, continuing through the Immigration
and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, and the Illegal Immigration Reformand Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996.77 The IIRIRA and the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act expanded “aggravated felony”
to encompass less serious crimes, reduced the minimum sentence from five
years to one year, and got rid of many defenses.78 The IIRIRA also changed
the name of “deportation proceedings” to “removal proceedings.”79
70. In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. DEC. 244, 247 (BIA 1982).
71.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006).
72. 3 IMMIGR. L. SERV. 2d (West) §§ 13:406-13:407 (2011).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75.
Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting), reh’g granted, 621 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010).
76. 3 IMMIGR. L. SERV. 2d (West) § 13-37 (2011).
77. Id. at §§ 13-19, 13-37.
78. Id. at § 13-19; Delgado, 563 F.3d at 884 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
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As the House of Representatives Report on the Criminal Alien Deportation Improvements Act of 1995 discussed, “only the most serious crimes”
are meant to “render the alien deportable.”80 This is meant to avoid the situation of “irrationally harsh sanctions for relatively minor crimes” as feared
by the House of Representatives.81 In order to maintain the international
obligations of the United States in its cooperation with the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the legislature limits the
crimes that would fit into the exemption from withholding of removal to
those that are more serious, rather than including crimes that are not serious
enough to be considered aggravated felonies.82 To give the statute an open
interpretation that left an exemption completely up to the discretion of the
Attorney General would defeat the purpose of identifying a crime as an
aggravated felony or as particularly serious in the first place.83
From the creation of the category in 1988 with the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act, through all of the progression discussed above, and up to the 1995
House of Representatives Report on the Criminal Alien Deportation Improvements Act, the definition of aggravated felonies has broadened, which
broadened “particularly serious crimes” along with it.84 In the context of
asylum cases, this has been acceptable since the asylum statute is a discretionary one.85 Contrastingly, withholding of removal is a statute with mandatory application, making the classification more definitive and significant.86 Removal has been recognized as “a harsh consequence.”87 In order
to make the withholding of removal statute mandatory, the construction of
the exemption should be narrower than the asylum statute’s exemption in
order to keep such a drastic occurrence from happening in unnecessary situations.88
The burden of proof for the withholding of removal statute falls on the
alien who is attempting to gain withholding.89 The applicant has to show
that it is more likely than not that his or her life or freedom would be threat-

80. H.R. REP. NO. 104-22 (1995).
81. H.R. REP. NO. 104-132, 213 (1996).
82.
Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting), reh’g granted, 621 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010).
83. Id.
84. 3 IMMIGR. L. SERV. 2d (West) § 13-37 (2011).
85. Asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B) (2009).
86.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006).
87. The Immigration and Naturalization Service: A Mandate for Change, Hearing
Before the Info., Justice, Transp., and Agric. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 103d Cong. (1993) (letter from Richard J. Wilson to Gary A. Condit).
88.
Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting), reh’g granted, 621 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010).
89.
8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (1998).
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ened in the country of removal.90 The factors by which to judge the applicant’s testimony include past threats to life or freedom91 as well as future
threats to life or freedom.92 The adjudicators should also consider the circumstances of the country to which the applicant would be removed and
whether the applicant would face serious harm.93 The burden of showing it
is not reasonable to relocate is on the applicant, unless the persecutor is a
government or government-sponsored, in which case the unreasonableness
is presumed.94
One thing considered by the House of Representatives in its hearings
on the INA was the difficulty of this standard of proof.95 The goal of this
higher standard was to “weaken incentives to file meritless applications.”96
This goal arose from concerns after the September 11, 2001 World Trade
Center attacks that non-refoulement (also known as withholding of removal) was simply being used as a loophole by alien convicts attempting to
avoid being removed from the United States.97
However, during the same hearing, the question of whether the standard of proof was too high was raised, with a concern that this was not humane treatment in accord with the United Nations Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees.98 Going along with this concern, the House of Representatives brought up the fact that withholding of removal (or “the right
of non-return”) is a “federally created liberty interest of which an individual
cannot be deprived without constitutional due process of law.”99 This shows
90. Id.
91.
8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (1998) (explaining that past threats to life or freedom create a
rebuttable presumption of a threat in the future in the same country based on the original
claim. The presumption is rebuttable if it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
there has been a change in circumstances or that the applicant could avoid the future threat.
If the applicant shows a past threat, the burden of showing these things is on the Service. If
the past threat is unrelated to the future threat, the burden is on the applicant to show it is
more likely than not that there is still a threat).
92.
8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (1998) (stating that applicants claiming a future threat to life
or freedom must establish that it is more likely than not that they would be persecuted. This
cannot be shown if the threat is avoidable. The applicant does not have to provide evidence
that they would be persecuted if there is a pattern of such persecution in which the applicant
would be included due to his or her affiliation with a certain group).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Asylum and Inspections Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Law,
Immigration, and Refugees of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
103d Cong. 276 (1993).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Asylum and Inspections Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Law,
Immigration, and Refugees of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
103d Cong. 276 (1993).
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the significance of protecting the applicant in accordance with the United
States’ international obligations.100
III. ANALYSIS
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that “the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides
that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because
of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.”101 The statute also provides an exception to this
rule if “the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of the United States.”102 The
INA clarifies with the explanation that:
[A]n alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony
(or felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced to an
aggregate term of imprisonment of at least five years shall
be considered to have committed a particularly serious
crime. The previous sentence shall not preclude the Attorney General from determining that, notwithstanding the
length of sentence imposed, an alien has been convicted of
a particularly serious crime.103
A.

PLAIN MEANING

The “plain meaning rule” of statutory construction insists on an interpretation of the statute based on the words used, or a “literal interpretation.”104 The Third Circuit in Alaka v. Attorney General of U.S. recognized
that the plain meaning rule is “perhaps the most fundamental principle of
statutory construction.”105 The dissenting opinion in Delgado v. Holder, a
Ninth Circuit decision, included a thorough examination of the statutory
language of the withholding of removal statute, including a list of cases
from the same circuit that had previously made such an examination of the
definition of particularly serious crimes.106 The dissent then concluded that
100. Id.
101.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(A) (2006).
102. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006).
103. Id.
104.
Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 495 (1992) (stating that
statutes should be interpreted using their literal meanings).
105.
Alaka v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 104 (3rd Cir. 2006) (discussing the
significance of the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation).
106.
Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 880-81 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting)
(citing Singh v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 435, 439 (9th Cir. 2003)), reh’g granted, 621 F.3d 957
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after reading the statutory text and coming up with a clear interpretation,
“there is nothing more to say.”107
As the above quoted text from the INA shows, non-aggravated felonies are not mentioned in the statute.108 While the INA does not explicitly
restrict its application to only aggravated felonies, as pointed out by the
Seventh Circuit in Ali v. Achim,109 the statutory construction implies such a
limitation.110 In the statute’s explanation of the definition of a particularly
serious crime, the first sentence refers specifically to “aggravated felonies,”111 an immediate suggestion that the statute is limited to such
crimes.112 The second sentence of this definition gives discretion to the Attorney General to determine which crimes are particularly serious, focusing
on the length of the sentence imposed, rather than the type of crime.113
Both of the opinions discussed that focused on the language of the
INA in interpreting its meaning concluded that crimes must be aggravated
felonies to be considered particularly serious.114 Since the second sentence
describing particularly serious crimes qualifies the Attorney General’s
power to designate the crime as such by referring back to the specific
phrase regarding the sentence length, the crime would still have to be an
aggravated felony to be considered a particularly serious crime, although it
would not need to have an imposed sentence of five years.115 Supporting
this interpretation, the Immigration Law Service states that the INA gives
the Attorney General the power to make a decision regarding convictions
for aggravated felonies for which a lesser sentence has been imposed.116
Other courts have argued that the language of the INA supports giving
the Attorney General full discretion to decide which crimes are particularly

(9th Cir. 2010); Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 987 (9th Cir. 2008); Afridi v. Gonzalez,
442 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2006).
107. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 881 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
108. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006).
109.
Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 470 (7th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that a lack of language recognizing non-aggravated felonies does not necessarily preclude them from being
considered particularly serious).
110.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1231 (b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006).
111. Id.
112.
Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 495 (stating that the
language of the statute should be used to interpret the meaning of the statute).
113.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006)
(“[N]otwithstanding the length of sentence imposed.”).
114.
Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 880-81 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting), reh’g granted, 621 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010); Alaka v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 456 F.3d 88,
103 (3d Cir. 2006).
115. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 880-81 (Berzon, J., dissenting); Alaka, 456 F.3d at 103.
116. 3 IMMIGR. L. SERV. 2d (West) §§ 13:406-13:407 (2011); Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006).
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serious on a case-by-case basis.117 The Ali court discusses that the statute
does not explicitly say that the Attorney General does not have discretion
over non-aggravated crimes being considered particularly serious.118 However, this interpretation would undermine the first sentence of the same
definition and cast doubt on the reason behind ever using the phrase “aggravated felony” to describe particularly serious crimes in the first place.119
In order to interpret the statute according to the plain meaning of the words
used, the phrase that describes a particularly serious crime as an “aggravated felony” means that a crime must be an aggravated felony in order to
be particularly serious.120
The plain meaning of the statute as read, focusing on the words that
are in the statute as opposed to those that are missing, leads to a determination that crimes must be aggravated felonies to be considered particularly
serious, as shown by both the Third Circuit opinion in Alaka and the dissenting opinion in the Ninth Circuit Delgado case.121
Considering the plain meaning of a statute also involves reading the
statute in connection with the other statutes around it that involve the same
subject matter, as statutes would not be likely to repeat the same intent
twice in a row and also are not likely to completely contradict one another.122 In this case, the withholding of removal statute in the INA can be read
alongside the asylum statute, which is very similar in that both decide
whether an alien is allowed to remain in the United States.123 However,
although both deal with the same subject matter, the withholding of removal statute has a mandatory application when applied, while the asylum statute has a discretionary application.124 A statute with a mandatory application, like the withholding of removal statute, would likely be limited to a
narrower and more specific type of crime such as an aggravated felony,
whereas a discretionary statute would likely be interpreted more broadly as
it can be judged on a case by case basis.125 This suggests that while a particularly serious crime in the asylum statute may not be limited to aggra-

117. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 868; Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 470 (7th Cir. 2006).
118. Ali, 468 F.3d at 470.
119. Id. (discussing that the use of certain language means that words not used are
excluded) (citing Dersch Energies, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 F.3d 846, 861 n.15 (7th Cir.
2002)).
120. Id.
121.
Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 880-81 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting), reh’g granted, 621 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010); Alaka v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 456 F.3d 88,
103 (3d Cir. 2006).
122. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 882 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
123. Asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2009).
124. Id.; Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006).
125. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 879 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
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vated felonies, the withholding of removal statute may contain such a restriction without conflicting with the statutes around it.126
B.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

While it is best to look at the plain meaning of statutes in order to determine their intent, when statutes are ambiguous in their use of language
courts often use the legislative history to interpret the meaning of the law.127
For example, in its analysis of the INA withholding of removal statute, the
majority opinion in Delgado v. Holder skipped over the plain meaning of
the statute right into an analysis of the legislative history.128 Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit in Ali v. Achim implied that the language of the INA’s
withholding of removal statute is ambiguous, after stating that if the statute
“speaks clearly and directly to the question at hand” no further inquiry is
necessary.129 The court then rejected Ali’s argument that the statute was
unambiguous as written.130 Even when looking into the legislative history
of the withholding of removal provision, the intent of the statute seems to
be to include only aggravated felonies in the classification of particularly
serious crimes.131

C. BURDEN OF PROOF
The burden of proof in a withholding of removal case falls on the alien
who is opposed to being removed from the United States back to his or her
native country. As previously discussed, the alien has to show that it is
more likely than not that his or her life or freedom would be threatened in
the country of removal.132 This makes it difficult for them, as evidence of
prior inhumane treatment or death of close family members, as in Delgado
v. Holder, may still not be considered enough evidence to be more likely

126. Id.
127.
BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 186 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing the use of legislative history in cases where the statutory language is ambiguous).
128.
Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 621 F.3d 957
(9th Cir. 2010).
129.
Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 468 (7th Cir. 2006) (mentioning that when a statute
is unambiguous, the statutory interpretation does not go beyond the language of the statute).
130. Ali, 468 F.3d at 468 (discussing that the statute as written was ambiguous and
that a further inquiry past the plain meaning of the statute was necessary).
131. See, e.g., The Immigration and Naturalization Service: A Mandate for Change,
Hearing Before the Info., Justice, Transp., and Agric. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t
Operations, 103d Cong. (1993) (letter from Richard J. Wilson to Gary A. Condit).
132.
8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (1998).
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than not that the aliens would be subject to human rights violations themselves upon their return.133
If the burden of proof was on the United States government to show
that the alien would not likely be subject to human rights violations when
returned to their home country, this would be fairer. The United States government is in a better position than the alien to know the current situation of
social and political groups, power struggles, and groups of people that are
being threatened at certain points in time in countries around the world,
whereas the alien has found refuge in the United States and has escaped the
knowledge of such things while they have been away from their native
country. The only source of such information that the alien would have to
find out the situation in their native country would be if they still had family
or friends in that nation, which may not be the case, especially when the
alien came to the United States because they were facing a threat to their
life or freedom in the first place.
Giving the alien the high burden of showing that such things are happening in their home country and, further, that they are likely to happen to
them upon their return supports the interpretation that the exemption from
withholding of removal should fall only on those who have committed the
most serious of crimes. If the alien is able to meet such a high burden of
proof to show that he or she will probably face human rights violations if
returned to their home nation, the United States is obligated by its commitment to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
to protect them from this, except in the most egregious circumstances.134
D.

COMPARISON TO CONVENTION

The INA was based on the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees and was passed to keep the United States in conformity with this international agreement.135 Specifically, the “nonrefoulement” provision of the Protocol is, as discussed in Part II of this
Comment, the origin of the withholding of removal statute.136 The similarities between the language used in the Convention and Protocol, as recognized in Delgado, suggest a desire on the part of the United States legislature to carry out the goal of the international community to protect people
in the U.S. from torture or inhumane treatment in their native countries un133. See Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 621 F.3d
957 (9th Cir. 2010).
134.
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 25, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150.
135.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006); United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 25, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
136. See discussion supra Part II.
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less that person has committed a crime that is serious enough to warrant
such treatment.137
While the Convention does not give a definition of particularly serious
crimes, the goal of the Convention to show “profound concern for refugees”
and “to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental
rights and freedoms” implies that the bar for crimes to be considered particularly serious should be a high one.138 If there were no limit on which
crimes were particularly serious, this would not further the interests of the
Convention and would defeat the purpose of the non-refoulement provision
altogether by providing little protection to the refugee who fears for his life
or safety.139 Because it fits the purpose of the Convention to limit the
crimes which can be considered particularly serious, and because the INA is
based on and similar to the Convention, it also fits the purpose of the INA
to limit the type of crime categorized as particularly serious.140
E.

HISTORY OF “AGGRAVATED FELONY”

The history of the term “aggravated felony” shows varying definitions
and is another reason that only aggravated felonies should be considered
particularly serious crimes.141 As the category broadened from 1988, with
its initiation in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, to 1996, with the passage of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),
more crimes were considered to be aggravated felonies, including crimes
that were less serious in nature.142
Because of the increased inclusiveness of the term aggravated felony,
few, if any, crimes with a high degree of seriousness are not categorized as
such.143 For this reason, the INA went so far as to limit particularly serious
crimes to aggravated felonies with a prison sentence of over five years, in
order to make sure that more trivial crimes were not included in this classification and would not be included in the exception to withholding of removal.144
137. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 869 (mentioning compliance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees).
138.
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 25, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150.
139. Id.
140.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006); United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 25, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
141.
Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting), reh’g granted, 621 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010).
142. 3 IMMIGR. L. SERV. 2d (West) §§ 13:37, 13:19 (2011).
143. Id.
144.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006) (limiting
the classification of particularly serious crimes to “[a]n alien who has been convicted of an
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Since the INA limits the application of the statute to crimes with a particular level of seriousness, and because most crimes of a serious nature are
now classified as aggravated felonies, the INA is limiting the classification
of particularly serious crimes to those that are already categorized as aggravated felonies.145 While there is a qualifying sentence at the end of the exception to withholding of removal, this qualifier is referring to the length of
the prison sentence in order to make sure the crime has reached a certain
level of seriousness, and is not referring to the categorization of the crime
as an aggravated felony, which would make the statute overbroad and ineffective for the purpose it is intended to serve.146
F.

HISTORY OF “PARTICULARLY SERIOUS CRIME”

The history of the term “particularly serious crime” reveals a less detailed, but nonetheless enlightening, amount of information on how the term
has been interpreted and defined in the past.147 The Immigration Law Service contains a discussion of per se particularly serious crimes, including a
list of crimes categorized as such and some criteria considered in developing that list.148 Characteristics of crimes that preclude them from being classified as particularly serious include: small quantity, modest amount of
money, peripheral involvement, absence of violence, absence of organized
crime or terrorist organization involvement, and absence of adverse or
harmful effect of activity or transaction on juveniles.149
These factors show that crimes with a less dangerous, less violent, or
less serious nature should not be included in the particularly serious crime
category.150 As already discussed above, most crimes that do have a serious,
dangerous, or violent nature are considered aggravated felonies.151 Since the
Immigration Law Service provided guidance on making sure that particularly serious crimes are serious enough in nature, and because those crimes
are already considered to be aggravated felonies, particularly serious crimes
should be limited to aggravated felonies so as not to include crimes that do
not go along with the guidelines set out by the Immigration Law Service

aggravated felony (or felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term
of imprisonment of at least 5 years shall be considered to have committed a particularly
serious crime”).
145. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006).
146. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006).
147. 3 IMMIGR. L. SERV. 2d (West) §13:407 (2011).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at §§ 13:37, 13:19.
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and punish more minor crimes in a way supposed to be limited to major
crimes.152
G.

BURDEN ON UNITED STATES SYSTEMS

While the considerations discussed (the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the histories of the terms “aggravated felony” and “particularly serious crime”) lead to a determination that
only the most serious crimes should be considered a bar to withholding of
removal, one may also consider the costs to the United States system of
justice when keeping criminal aliens in the country rather than sending
them back to their native countries.153 Costs imposed on both state and local
governments include medical care, education, police forces, and prison systems.154
The criminal justice system has greatly increased costs for every criminal alien kept in the U.S. prison system rather than being sent off to another country.155 In the Federal Bureau of Prisons Facilities, criminal aliens
make up twenty-nine percent of prisoners and are the fastest growing segment of the federal prison population.156 In 1999, the cost to state prisons of
housing criminal aliens was $624,000,000.157 In 2002, the cost to federal
prisons of housing criminal aliens was $891,000,000.158 In Illinois alone,
criminal aliens cost over $40,000,000 just for incarceration.159
With a greater number of aliens in the United States, along with the
fact that they are the fastest growing segment of the federal prison population, one concern is a possible growing threat to public safety and national
security, leading to increased costs for police forces.160 Additionally, increased security systems, especially after the attacks on the World Trade

152. 3 IMMIGR. L. SERV. 2d (West) §§ 13:37, 13:19 (2011).
153. Impact of Fed. Immigration Policy and INS Activities on Communities: Hearings Before the Info., Justice, Transp., & Agric. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 104th Cong. (1995).
154. Id.
155. Impact of Federal Immigration Policy and INS Activities on Cmtys.: Hearings
Before the Info., Justice, Transp.,& Agric. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations,
103d Cong. 36 (1994) (statement of Joe Sandoval, Secretary, Youth and Adult Correctional
Agency, accompanied by Tom Goggenhauer, California Department of Corrections).
156. Criminal Aliens, FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM (October 2002),
http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecenters0b9c.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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Center on September 11, 2001, have been implemented nationwide, imposing additional costs and requiring additional police forces to run them.161
Aside from the criminal justice system, there are also great costs to the
United States system of public schools.162 As more immigration occurs and
more aliens enter the country, more school-aged children enter also, contributing to a problem of school overcrowding.163 The number of school children who are immigrants and children of immigrants has tripled in the past
thirty years, leading to a current number of 55,000,000 school-aged immigrants or children of immigrants.164 These great numbers have necessitated
more money to go toward new schools to accommodate the great number of
students as well as bilingual education to accommodate the increasing
group of students who do not speak English.165 There has also been great
concern recently over the issue of foreign students taking the limited number of spots offered in United States colleges, graduate programs, and doctoral programs rather than United States citizens getting them.166
These costs are daunting, and make a convincing case for limiting the
number of aliens that should be allowed to remain in the United States.
However, interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act to include only
aggravated felonies in the particularly serious crime category does not mean
that any alien who commits a non-aggravated crime will remain in the
United States.167 This only applies in the limited circumstances when it is
more likely than not that the “alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in
their native country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”168 In another more
common situation, where the alien is from a nation in which his or her human rights would not likely be violated, the alien would still be sent back to
his or her native country and would no longer be placing a burden on the
United States system of justice, or any other United States system.169
When the less common situation occurs that the criminal alien is from
a nation in which his or her human rights are at risk, while the costs to the
161. Criminal Aliens, FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM (October 2002),
http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecenters0b9c.
162. Immigration and School Overcrowding, FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM (October
2002),
http://www.fairus.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=16935&security=1601&news_iv_
ctrl=1010.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006).
168. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006).
169.
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006) (The statute only applies when the alien’s life or
freedom is threatened.).
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United States are still real and significant, they do not excuse turning away
from international commitments and human rights considerations.170 The
concerns of resources for our criminal justice system are outweighed by the
possibility of unnecessary torture and death for criminal aliens that have not
committed crimes of a severity that warrants a classification of at least aggravated felony and, further, particularly serious crime.171 The United States
also committed itself to the goal of protecting those who have not committed crimes of that seriousness through the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.172 To bring the enforcement of this agreement down to the level of undermining its effect would lower the value of
such a commitment, and prestige of a promise from the United States of
America.
The withholding of removal statute does not necessarily require that
the criminal alien remain in the United States, but prohibits the alien from
being returned to his or her native country.173 Rather than keeping the criminal alien in the United States, the alien could be sent away to a third country where the cost is not borne by the United States and the alien is not deprived of his basic human rights.174 For these reasons, the costs on the criminal justice system of the United States do not justify a more relaxed interpretation of the particularly serious crime exception of the INA.175
H.

FRENTESCU FACTORS

Delgado v. Holder, Ali v. Achim, and Tian v. Holder each discuss the
use of “Frentescu factors” in determining on a case-by-case basis which
crimes should be considered particularly serious.176 These factors include
the “nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying facts of the
conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and, most importantly, whether
the type and circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a
danger to the community.”177 While these factors may be helpful in deter170.
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 25, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006).
174. Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29, 40 (1st Cir. 1997) (discussing the differences
between the withholding of removal statute and the asylum statute and mentioning the possibility of sending criminal aliens to a third country rather than their country of origin).
175. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006).
176.
Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890, 897 (8th Cir. 2009); Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d
863, 868 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 621 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010); Ali v. Achim, 468
F.3d 462, 470 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 1982)) (discussing the Frentescu factors for determining whether a crime should be categorized as
particularly serious).
177. In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 1982).
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mining the seriousness of crimes, this analysis would not be necessary in
every case if it could be determined that aggravated felonies were a minimal requirement for particularly serious crimes. This requirement would cancel out any other crimes from even needing to be considered, saving court
resources and time. Using the Frentescu factors on their own without limiting them to analyzing only aggravated felonies would result in an unnecessary use of the court’s time and resources, which would lead to fewer criminal aliens being removed due to a slow down of the trial process.178 Although proponents of these factors’ usage outside of aggravated felonies are
in favor of removing more criminal aliens who have committed less serious
crimes, their position would actually have the potential to remove fewer
criminal aliens who have committed more serious crimes.179
While there should not always need to be a case-by-case determination
for particularly serious crimes, when there is an aggravated felony with a
sentence of less than five years, the Frentescu factors could be used to determine whether it is particularly serious, as pointed out by the Eighth Circuit in Tian v. Holder.180 The Frentescu factors are aimed at narrowing
crimes down to the most serious ones, as is the “aggravated crime” classification.181 Using the two together would be an effective way to combine the
analyses of the different circuits’ interpretations of the INA, and gain a
good way to limit particularly serious crimes to only the most serious ones,
as intended.182 This use of the Frentescu factors would maintain the correct
interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (by excluding nonaggravated crimes from the particularly serious crime classification), save
the courtroom resources that would have been wasted with unnecessary
considerations of less serious crimes, and guide the determination of which
aggravated felonies with lesser sentences should be categorized as particularly serious crimes.183

178. The Immigration and Naturalization Service: A Mandate for Change, Hearing
Before the Info., Justice, Transp., and Agric. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 103d Cong. (1993).
179. Id.
180. Tian, 576 F.3d 890 (discussing the use of the Frentescu factors in the determination of whether aggravated felonies with sentences of less than five years should be considered particularly serious crimes).
181. Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247 (“[A] ‘particularly serious crime’ is more
serious than a ‘serious nonpolitical crime’ . . . .”); 3 IMMIGR. L. SERV. 2d (West) § 13:19
(2011); Delgado, 563 F.3d at 884 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
182. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006).
183.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006); The Immigration and
Naturalization Serv.: A Mandate for Change, Hearing Before the Info., Justice, Transp., and
Agric. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 103d Cong. (1993).
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IV. RESULTS
A.

EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

1.

Non-Refoulement

In the event of the implementation of this interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the pool of people who would face removal
would be more limited than it is today.184 Today, in circuits such as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, where withholding of removal may be denied
even in the absence of the commission of an aggravated felony, more
people who have committed less serious offenses are sent away from the
United States to native countries in which they may face persecution, torture, or even death.185 By interpreting the INA to preclude those who have
not committed aggravated crimes from being sent back to such nations,
those who have committed less serious crimes–crimes that are not considered to be particularly serious due to their non-aggravated classification–
will no longer have to fear that their lives in the United States will be
uprooted. Instead, these criminals will face punishments within the justice
system here in the United States, rather than penalties that are excessive for
the severity of the crime committed.
While many will avoid removal in the event of interpreting the INA to
preclude non-refoulement except in the case of aggravated felonies, others
will still be sent away to their native countries to face potential persecution.
Those who may still be denied withholding of removal will be only those
who have committed a crime so severe in nature that it is considered to be
an aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime.186 If the INA is enforced effectively, the number of more serious criminals being removed
from the United States should rise, even though the pool of people is limited. By being harsher on those who have committed the particularly serious aggravated felonies, the most dangerous criminals will continue to be
taken out of the United States community, while allowing those who have
184. See, e.g., Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that although some aggravated crimes are automatically considered to be particularly serious, this
does not preclude the attorney general from finding that a non-aggravated crime is also
particularly serious), reh’g granted, 621 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010); Nethagani v. Mukasey,
532 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the Second Circuit defers to the decision of the
BIA in that crimes do not need to be aggravated felonies in order to be considered to be
particularly serious); Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that nonaggravated crimes may be considered to be particularly serious if the Attorney General so
designates them).
185. See, e.g., Delgado, 563 F.3d 863 (holding that Delgado would be sent back to El
Salvador although he had not committed an aggravated felony).
186. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006).
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not been guilty of such serious offenses to live their lives without threat to
their life or freedom. Sending away those who do not deserve such punishments while others who have committed more serious crimes are allowed to
remain in the United States due to a lack of enforcement would be a larger
problem to solve. Removing the criminals who have committed the most
serious aggravated crimes from the United States is desirable in that the
justice system will no longer bear the cost of dealing with them, and the
United States will not have breached its international obligations through
the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.187 It is
the right thing to do to remove the most serious criminals to their native
countries even in the face of possible danger because the offense they have
committed is serious enough to warrant such a punishment and is not excessive under the circumstances.188
2.

Reduced Power of Attorney General

By interpreting the INA to mean that only aggravated felonies may be
considered particularly serious crimes, the wide discretion currently given
to the Attorney General in the circuits interpreting otherwise will be diminished. Rather than having the authority to send any criminal alien back to
their native country, regardless of the circumstances that they will face
there, the Attorney General would be limited in such punishments to those
who have committed crimes serious enough to be both an aggravated felony
and, further, a particularly serious crime.
This is similar to limiting discretion on judges, as both avoid unequal
and unjust application of the law. The United States justice system has a
long history of limiting the discretion of judges in favor of jury trials or
laws that set a bright line rule that limits the power that one person’s discretion may have over the law.189 Beginning back in the eighteenth century
with our English predecessors, judges were given little discretion in sentencing matters.190 Laws were written to be “sanction-specific,” giving a

187.
Impact of Fed. Immigration Policy and INS Activities on Cmtys.: Hearings
Before the Info., Justice, Transp., & Agric. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations,
103d Cong. 36 (1994) (statement of Joe Sandoval, Secretary, Youth and Adult Correctional
Agency, accompanied by Tom Goggenhauer, California Department of Corrections); United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 25, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
188. Asylum and Inspections Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Law,
Immigration, & Refugees of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 276 (1993).
189. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 314 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(discussing that giving judges full discretion leads to inequitable results); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (discussing that judges have not historically been given discretion over serious matters except within statutory limits).
190. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479.
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specific punishment for each crime that was committed.191 Although judges
were allowed discretion in some instances, due to the particularly serious
nature of the crimes at issue in the INA, such discretion would not have
been permitted in this type of circumstance.192 Punishments of “smaller
faults, and omissions of less consequence” were more likely to be swayed
by a particular judge’s thoughts on the subject than something more serious.193 It was permissible for judges to exercise their power “within statutory limits” and the “determination and sentence of the law,” but they could
not go beyond this.194 Rather than being an outdated method of legal interpretation, these principles have guided recent Supreme Court decisions and
are alive and well today.195
Without such limitation on the discretion of one single person, inequality between the decisions different judges, or in this case, between different
Attorneys General, in different situations would be the effect.196 As pointed
out in Blakely v. Washington, “unguided discretion inevitably result[s] in
severe disparities in sentences received and served by defendants committing the same offense. . . .”197 Without a law that gives one rule to be applied equally to similar situations in different places or with different decision-makers, there would be no uniformity in the United States justice system.198 A person’s punishment for a crime would “depend on ‘what the
judge ate for breakfast’ on the day of sentencing, on which judge you got,
or on other factors that should not have made a difference . . . .”199 By interpreting the INA to mean that only aggravated felonies may be considered to
be particularly serious crimes, the U.S. justice system can avoid such unjust
results and ensure a fairer and more uniform application of the law as it was
intended to be enforced.200
V. CONCLUSION
Although there are opposing interests to consider when determining
how the INA withholding of removal statute should be applied, the most
significant interests, as well as the strongest arguments for statutory interpretation, lend themselves to a minimal requirement of an aggravated felo191. Id.
192. Id. at 480.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 479-80, 481.
195. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466.
196. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 315 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 332 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
200. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 596 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (discussing the importance of uniform application of the law).
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ny in order to be considered particularly serious crimes. The plain language
of the withholding of removal statute, the histories of the terms “aggravated
felony” and “particularly serious crime,” and the commitment of the United
States to promote the goals of the United Nations Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees, all support the interpretation that only aggravated
felonies should be included in the category of particularly serious crimes.201
The costs to the United States of maintaining the criminal alien that has not
committed an aggravated felony is minimal compared to the cost of sending
someone who has not committed a particularly serious crime back to a nation where they may be tortured or killed. Particularly serious crimes need a
strict interpretation excluding any crimes other than aggravated felonies.
JESSICA FIOCCHI

201. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006); 3 IMMIGR.
L. SERV. 2d (West) § 13:19 (2011); Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 884 (9th Cir. 2009)
(Berzon, J., dissenting), reh’g granted, 621 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010); 3 IMMIGR. L. SERV. 2d
(West) §§ 13:406-13:407 (2011).
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